Population Council

Knowledge Commons

2002

Childcare, mothers' work, and earnings: Findings from the urban
slums of Guatemala City
Kelly Hallman
Population Council

Agnes R. Quisumbing
Marie T. Ruel
Benedicte de la Briere

Follow this and additional works at: https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/departments_sbsr-pgy
Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society
Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, and the International Public Health Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Hallman, Kelly, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Marie T. Ruel, and Benedicte de la Briere. 2002. "Childcare, mothers'
work, and earnings: Findings from the urban slums of Guatemala City," Policy Research Division Working
Paper no. 165. New York: Population Council.

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Population Council.

PA
PE
Childcare, Mothers’ Work,
and Earnings: Findings from the
Urban Slums of Guatemala City
Kelly Hallman
Agnes R. Quisumbing
Marie Ruel
Bénédicte de la Brière

E

A

R

C

H

D

I

V

I

S

I

O

N

woRKING

O

L

I

C

Y

R

E

S

2002 No. 165

Y E A R S

P

1952–2002

Childcare, Mothers’ Work, and Earnings:
Findings from the Urban Slums of Guatemala City
Kelly Hallman
Agnes R. Quisumbing
Marie Ruel
Bénédicte de la Brière

Kelly Hallman is Research Associate, Policy Research Division, Population Council.
Agnes R. Quisumbing and Marie Ruel are Senior Research Fellows, International Food
Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. Bénédicte de la Brière is Sustainable Development Adviser, Department for International Development, Tocantines, Brazil.

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of childcare on work and earnings of mothers
in the slums of Guatemala City. Recognizing that mother’s work behavior may depend
on the availability of childcare, the modeling approach allows participation in the labor
force and use of formal daycare to be jointly determined. We also investigate whether a
mother’s “status” within her household (as measured by the value of the assets she brought
to her marriage) influences her entry into the labor force. Finally, we explore the impact
of childcare prices on a mother’s earnings, conditional on her decision to work.
The study uses a survey of 1,363 randomly selected mothers (working and nonworking) with preschool children carried out in 1999 by the International Food Policy
Research Institute. In this sample, 37 percent of mothers with preschoolers worked for
pay in the 30 days before the survey. Mothers were employed in a variety of occupations and sectors and used an assortment of different informal and formal childcare
arrangements. Our results indicate that participation in the labor force and use of formal daycare are in fact joint decisions for mothers. Life-cycle and household demographic factors have important effects on both decisions. Maternal education is an
important determinant of use of formal daycare, but does not have large effects on
whether a mother works for pay or not. Higher household wealth reduces her chances
of working. However, the higher the value of assets she brought to her marriage, the
more likely she is to be working. Greater travel time from home to formal daycare
reduces its use. Controlling for endogeneity of labor market participation and formal
daycare use, childcare prices have no impact on maternal earnings. This suggests that
policies to increase the availability of formal daycare in poor urban areas have the
potential to raise labor force participation rates of mothers in such neighborhoods, but
not necessarily their earnings conditional upon their entry into the labor force.
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High rates of urbanization and increasing levels of female participation in the
labor force are beginning to increase the demand for nonparental childcare in Latin
America. Emerging shifts in the structure of urban production toward more manufacturing and industry mean that employment opportunities for women are expected increasingly to occur in settings that are not compatible with the care of children. Market work
and caring for one’s children are activities that will become more separate and compete
for a mother’s time. Rural-to-urban migration often means moving away from extended
family, which decreases access to informal childcare givers.
This situation is especially pronounced in Guatemala. Between 1990 and 1994, the
urbanization rate was 3.9 percent, compared to 2.7 percent for Latin America overall (Inter-American Development Bank 1997). Increasing urbanization has been accompanied
by an increase in the number and percentage of households headed by single women. Approximately one-fifth of urban households in Guatemala and in Latin America overall are
headed by women (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales 1995; Instituto Nacional
de Estadística and Macro International 1996). This phenomenon is the result of several
related trends: a decline in the proportion of multigenerational households and an increase
in the number of single-parent families because of divorce and widowhood.1 Moreover,
half of urban female-headed households in Guatemala are poor and one-quarter are indigent, making this one of the most disadvantaged groups in all of Latin America (Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 1995).
This situation is fueled by a number of factors. First, such households have a small
number of potential labor market participants (Sedlacek, Gutierrez, and Mohindra 1993).
Second, levels of education and literacy are low. Guatemalan women have an average of
5.9 years of education and only 73 percent are literate (Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean 1995)—both figures are low compared with Latin American
averages.2 Among urban heads of households, female heads have an average of 1.5 fewer
years of education than male heads, affecting their chances of obtaining employment, their
sector of work, and their earnings. Among working household heads, the gender education
gap alone translates into 15–20 percent lower earnings for women with otherwise similar
characteristics to their male counterparts (Arends 1992; Funkhouser 1996). Third, urban
female heads have lower levels of economic activity compared to male heads, partly be-

cause of gender education deficits that reduce female job opportunities. Finally, sectoral
and occupational segregation result in many women working in the informal sector3—
accounting for approximately 63 percent of urban female employment in Guatemala—
where earnings are one-third those in the formal sector (Funkhouser 1996) and in lowerpaying occupations that are identified as typically female.
Higher unemployment rates and fewer working hours observed for female compared with male urban heads are hypothesized to be due in part to coordination difficulties between hours and location of work and the availability of childcare. One study in
Brazil (Deutsch 1998), for example, finds a lack of childcare options given as a primary
cause of unemployment among urban women. The scarcity of childcare options is especially crucial for women without spouses, who often must choose informal-sector jobs
for their flexibility despite their low returns.
Does provision of childcare have an impact on women’s work and earnings? This
study attempts to answer the question by analyzing work, childcare arrangements, and
earnings of mothers in the urban slums of Guatemala City. The study, designed by the
authors, is based on data from a random sample of 1,363 mothers with preschool children residing in one colonia of Guatemala City in 1999. Data were collected as part of
an impact evaluation of the Hogares Comunitarios government-sponsored daycare program by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).4 The study is different from previous studies on childcare choice that take mothers’ labor force participation as given. Although those who demand childcare are, for the most part, working
mothers, if a mother’s work status is influenced by the availability of childcare, an examination of the determinants and consequences of childcare choice should not be conditioned upon her work status. Information on a woman’s current situation, family background, current household, children, and community was solicited from working and
nonworking mothers so that care choices could be examined in conjunction with a
mother’s labor force activities.
Our results indicate that participation in the labor market and use of formal daycare
are joint decisions of mothers. Life-cycle and household demographic factors appear to
have important effects on both decisions. Maternal education is an important determinant of use of formal daycare, but does not have large effects on whether or not a mother

4

works for pay. Higher household wealth reduces a mother’s chances of working, presumably via an income effect. However, the higher the value of assets she brought to her
marriage, the more likely she is to be working. Greater travel time from home reduces
use of formal daycare. Controlling for endogeneity of labor market participation and
formal daycare use, daycare prices do not have a significant impact on earnings. This
suggests that interventions to increase the availability of formal daycare in poor urban
areas have the potential to raise labor force participation rates of mothers residing in
such neighborhoods, but not necessarily their earnings conditional upon their having
entered the labor force.
C ONCEPTUAL M ODEL OF W ORK AND C HILDCARE C HOICE
To anticipate the discussion, we present a brief model of women’s labor supply
and childcare choice. Suppose, for simplicity, that the decisionmaker is a woman who is
choosing whether or not to work and what form of childcare she will use. Her household’s
utility function can be characterized as:
U = U(Xp, Xh, L),

(1)

where Xp refers to market-purchased goods, Xh refers to “home-produced” goods such
as child health and nutrition, and L is leisure. Now suppose that home-produced goods
can be produced using either household labor supply th or substitutes thereof, such as
childcare services tc, that is,
Xh = f(th, tc).

(2)

Suppose that the household receives income from wage labor and from asset
earnings. For simplicity, take the income of the woman’s husband Yh as exogenous to
her own decision whether to enter the labor force. Let us assume, similar to Gustafsson
and Stafford (1992), that an hour of a woman’s market time requires the substitution of
childcare services for her own time, at the price pc. Thus, the net return to a woman’s
time on the labor market is given by (w – pc). The household’s income constraint can
then be written as:
pa • A + (w – pc) • tw + Yh = pXp,

(3)

where pa • A is the value of asset earnings or unearned income, (w – pc) • tw is income
from wage labor net of childcare costs (where w is the market wage rate, tw is time spent
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in the labor market, and pc is the price of a unit of childcare), and Yh is the husband’s
income. Household income is spent on purchases of the market-produced good, Xp.5
The time of individuals in the household is allocated to time in the labor market,
time producing home goods, and leisure. Thus, the household time constraint is as follows:
T = tw + th + L.

(4)

Incorporating the household time constraint into the income constraint, the full income
constraint can be written as
pXp + w • L = wT + (phXh – w • th – pctc) + pa • A + Yh.

(5)

That is, total consumption, including the value of time spent in leisure, cannot exceed
full income. Full income is the value of time available to all household members, “profits” from “home production” (less childcare costs), nonlabor income, and husband’s income. Maximizing (1) subject to the full income constraint yields reduced-form demand
functions for goods x and leisure L, which can be written as a function of prices, wages,
and unearned income, given the household’s asset levels A and husband’s income Yh.
x = x(p, w; A, Yh)

(6)

L = l(p, w; A, Yh).

(7)

Because leisure is a normal good, we expect that leisure increases with wages (because
of an income effect), asset earnings, and husband’s income. Conversely, the woman’s
time supplied to the labor market,
tw = T – th – L = l' (p, w; A, Yh),

(8)

would increase with own wages, and decrease with asset holdings and husband’s income. However, recall that the net return to a woman’s time in the labor market is not
the market wage but w – tc. So, we expect that while a woman’s time on the labor market
will increase with w, it will decrease with childcare costs tc.
P REVIOUS S TUDIES ON M ATERNAL W ORK AND
C HILDCARE C HOICE
Demand for childcare services
The preceding exposition obviously simplifies the many dimensions of the demand for childcare by working mothers by assuming there is a one-for-one match be-
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tween work time and childcare time. In fact, several sets of factors influence the demand
for various types of childcare arrangements. These include the need for mother substitutes for care, whether or not her work is in her home or at a remote location, and the
number and ages of her preschool children. The availability, price, and quality of various mother-care substitutes will influence her choice. Conditional on her being in the
labor force, a higher wage, greater household income, and greater number of work hours
should each increase demand for all forms of nonparental childcare through positive
income effects. A mother’s earning potential is expected to raise demand for daycare
services because it increases the opportunity cost of her leisure time. Demand for higherquality, more reliable services is expected to respond positively to household income
and maternal education. Ethnicity and family background variables may capture differences in cultural preferences and attitudes regarding acceptable forms of childcare.
Much of the literature on the demand for daycare is from more-developed countries (Hotz and Kilburn 1995; Johansen 1990; Johansen, Leibowitz, and Waite 1996;
Lehrer 1988; Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger 1988; Robins and Spiegelman 1978;
Waite, Leibowitz, and Witsberger 1991); however, some results are available for lowincome countries (Connelly, DeGraff, and Levison 1996; Deutsch 1998; Lokshin 2000;
Lokshin, Glinskaya, and Garcia 2000).
Daycare choice is often modeled as a multidimensional outcome variable by type
or location of care. Not surprisingly, higher own-price lowers the probability of that
particular type of care being used (Lokshin 2000; Lokshin, Glinskaya, and Garcia 2000).
Greater household income increases demand for formal, center-based, as opposed to
home-based, informal services (Hofferth and Wissoker 1992). Mother’s education has a
similar effect, most likely because center-based care is perceived to have stronger educational components than care in a private home setting (Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger
1988). Evidence on the effect of quality of care on demand is lacking because of the
dearth of information on characteristics of care settings and caregivers. If quality is
included in the model, either it is not modeled directly (Michalopoulos, Robins, and
Garfinkel 1992) or it may be represented by proxy measures such as child-to-provider
ratios (Hofferth and Wissoker 1992). Child age has been shown to be an important de-
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terminant of type of arrangement used; the demand for nonrelative and center-based
formal care increases during the child’s second year of life, while informal relative and
home-based care is preferred for infants (Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992; Leibowitz,
Waite, and Witsberger 1988). The presence of alternative caregivers in the home has
been shown to reduce the demand for formal childcare services. A study from urban
Brazil (Deutsch 1998) shows, in fact, that the presence of older children and adults in
the household is the only significant determinant of demand for formal care; their presence reduces it. Another analysis of demand for childcare in urban Brazil using a different data source indicates that females ages 10 and older in the household are a major
source of daycare; males in the household, however, are not (Connelly, DeGraff, and
Levison 1996).
Impact of childcare availability on mothers’ labor force behavior
A mother’s decision to work will be influenced by her earning potential, her own
characteristics, and those of her household. The presence of young children imposes a
constraint to her work because they must be cared for at all times. Therefore, the price
and availability of childcare are expected to affect her decision to seek employment.
Moreover, if a mother’s preferences for work are related in unobservable ways to her
preferences for childcare, then the choice of her work status could be made simultaneously with her childcare decision. For example, one mother may have stronger preferences for child health and education investments than another. Such factors influencing
childcare preference may also affect her decision to enter the labor force. In other words,
the menu of possible childcare arrangements could affect her entry into the labor force;
if certain mothers work only when the “right” type of childcare is available, then factors
affecting selection into work could also influence choices for care. We will address this
possible source of selection bias by employing an estimation approach that allows for
the labor force entry and childcare decisions to be related, as described below.6
Numerous investigations of maternal labor market behavior have considered the
effect that young children have on work. Only relatively recently, however, have childcare
availability and cost been explicitly considered in such models. In developing countries,
care availability is often measured by the presence of other individuals in the household
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who can potentially act as a substitute for the mother’s care. The evidence consistently
shows that the presence of other females in the household increases the probability of a
mother’s working (Connelly, DeGraff, and Levison 1996; Deutsch 1998; Pitt and
Rosenzweig 1990; Tiefenthaler 1997; Wong and Levine 1992). There are usually no
direct costs associated with this form of care, and the opportunity cost of provision of
care by these individuals is normally not incorporated into the analysis. One important
difference between poor and rich countries is the age of these potential care providers;
in developing countries girls as young as age 6 have been shown to increase mother’s
work when there are younger children in the home who need care; in more-developed
countries, this effect is usually observed with the presence of other adult females in the
home, often a child’s grandmother.
The effect of costs of nonrelative daycare on maternal labor supply has been
examined by several studies of women in industrial countries. Availability of formal
childcare centers, as measured by regional dummies to capture variation in the geographical density of daycare centers, has been found to positively affect mother’s participation in the work force in the United States (Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger 1988).
Childcare tax credits have a similar effect on labor market re-entry for mothers of very
young children (Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992). Ribar (1992) finds large negative effects of market childcare costs on married women’s employment status;
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992), however, find only very small positive
responses in hours worked to a childcare subsidy among both married and single mothers. Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) find that married women’s labor supply increases in
response to subsidies for high-quality childcare services only.7 Gelbach (2002) finds
that access to free “childcare” (defined as eligibility for school enrollment among fiveyear-olds) has a positive and significant influence on single mothers’ labor force participation and hours worked.
Evidence from low-income countries is provided by Lokshin (2000), Lokshin,
Glinskaya, and Garcia (2000), and Deutsch (1998).8 The first two studies find that mother’s
labor force participation and work hours in Russia and Kenya, respectively, decrease in
response to rising childcare costs. Deutsch finds no significant effect of communitylevel daycare costs on mother’s labor supply and work hours in urban Brazil.9
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Impact of childcare availability and choice on mothers’ earnings
Earnings are determined by wages and labor hours. Choices made by mothers regarding their childcare arrangements can affect not only whether they work, but the type
of work they engage in and the amount of time they spend in paid work. Access to reliable
daycare may enable mothers to participate in types of work that are not compatible with
simultaneously caring for their children, such as jobs in manufacturing and industrial settings that often pay more than traditional forms of employment for poor urban women.
Greater availability of childcare may therefore influence a mother’s wage by expanding
the types of jobs she is able to apply for and maintain. It could also potentially increase the
number of hours she spends working. Conversely, higher childcare prices may reduce
labor hours by increasing the opportunity cost of working.
We are aware of only one other study that examines the effect of women’s work and
childcare choices on earnings in a developing-country setting. For poor, urban Brazilian
women, Deutsch (1998) models the influence of labor force participation on earnings, then
separately models the influence of childcare decisions on earnings. The simultaneous influences of both decisions are not modeled because of a lack of separate instrumental
variables for labor force entry and childcare choice; the same variables are used to estimate
both selection equations separately. In both versions of the earnings equation, hours are
assumed to be exogenous, and underlying reduced-form determinants of wages are used
instead of predicted wages.10 As described below, we are able to model both the decision to
work and the decision to use formal daycare simultaneously in our earnings equations.
D ATA AND E MPIRICAL S PECIFICATION
Sampling methodology
The study was carried out in Guatemala City and included all households located
in Mixco, one of three urban zones in which the Hogares Comunitarios program was
operating in 1999 (the zones were Mixco, Villa Nueva, and Zone 18). Mixco was selected for the study for several reasons. The area was entirely urban; the operations
evaluation results (Ruel, de la Brière, Hallman et al. 2002) did not reveal any significant
differences in the acceptability of the program, quality of services offered, length of
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time children spent in the program, and other operational aspects; and this zone had the
fewest security problems likely to endanger the field study team.
A random sample was drawn from households having resident children ages 0–7
years. The outcome variable of interest for calculating the sample size for the random sample
was women’s labor force participation. Using information from the 1995 Guatemala National Survey of Maternal and Child Health, we found that a difference of 25 percent would
be a reasonable assumption for the effect that the program could have on motivating women
to enter the labor force. Twenty-five percent is the magnitude of the difference between the
labor force participation of poorly educated women with children ages 0–6 years and similarly educated women with no preschool children. For this magnitude of difference, a sample
of 1,266 households was needed; the actual sample size is 1,363 households.
As described in the Appendix table, the household survey collected data on
childcare arrangements, mother’s work, household demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, family background and social networks of the mother, and nutritional status
of mother and children. The data, questionnaires, and description of the study are available upon request from IFPRI’s Web site (www.ifpri.org).
Joint estimation of maternal use of formal childcare
and labor force participation
The preceding discussion suggests that the decision to enter the labor force and
the use of formal childcare (as opposed to informal care or care by the mother herself)
are interrelated decisions. One approach would have been to model the childcare decision as conditional on the woman’s labor force participation, using a probit model with
selectivity. The approach we use here better reflects the decisionmaking process by estimating both choices jointly using a bivariate probit model. That is, we assume that the
underlying model is given by
y1'* = ∃'1x1 + γ1,

y1 = 1 if y1* > 0, 0 otherwise,

y2'* = ∃'2x2 + γ2,

y2 = 1 if y2* > 0, 0 otherwise,
E[γ1] = E[γ2] = 0,

Var[γ1] = Var[γ2] = 1,
Cov[γ1, γ2] = ∆.
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(9)

Labor force participation y1 is also modeled as a binary variable. It is a function
of a vector of exogenous variables x1 that includes the mother’s personal characteristics
(education, age, age squared, and ethnicity), which are also likely to influence her wage;
the household’s age and sex composition, which would capture the need for childcare,
the presence of other potential income earners, and the availability of substitutes for
mother’s time in childcare; the availability and price of formal care; the availability and
price of informal care; the value of household productive assets (those that can be used
to earn income in an urban slum environment); and instrumental variables for labor
force participation, including the value of assets that the woman brought to her marriage
(or union), as an indicator of her status or “bargaining power” within the household,
family background variables that may have shaped her labor force behavior during adolescence and early adulthood (composition of her natal household and her mother’s
work behavior when this woman was a child), and local labor market opportunities
(community median of the female wage and the proportion of mothers working).
Choice of formal care y2 is a latent variable that takes on the observed values 0
and 1 and is a function of a vector of exogenous variables x2 that includes the mother’s
own characteristics (education, age, age squared, and ethnicity); the need for childcare
(number of preschoolers in the household and the age of the youngest child); the availability and price of formal care; the availability and price of informal care; the value of
household productive assets; and instrumental variables for formal care choice, including family background variables such as whether her mother used nonfamily or formal
daycare when the woman was a child. Availability and price of formal care are assumed
to be exogenous and are captured by a number of variables: the community median
price of formal care, the distance from home to formal care, and the distance from work
to formal care. The distance variables are an attempt to account for the time costs due to
travel time to the childcare facility. Similarly, the price of informal care includes variables that capture both monetary and time costs—the community median price of informal care, and travel time from home to the caregiver and from caregiver to work. The
number of nonpreschoolers in various age and sex categories, particularly adult females,
is an indicator of the availability of informal care.
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The test that both equations are interdependent is equivalent to testing whether
the null hypothesis of ∆ = 0 can be rejected.
In the alternative specification,11 we examine the joint and perhaps interrelated
decisions of using formal childcare and number of hours worked, including zero hours.
Here the use of formal daycare, y2, is still a latent variable taking the observed values 0
and 1, but now y1 is hours worked and is modeled as a continuous variable, taking both
zero and positive values, and potentially affected by y2. That is,
y1' = ∃'1x1 + δy2 + γ1,
y2'* = ∃'2x2 + γ2,

(10)

y2 = 1 if y2* > 0, 0 otherwise,

where γ1 and γ2 are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix
σ

∆

∆

1

The test that the equations are interdependent is again equivalent to testing whether the
null hypothesis of ∆ = 0 can be rejected.
Impact of childcare availability and choice on maternal earnings
Controlling for mother’s choices to work and to use formal daycare, we examine
the impact of childcare price on earnings. As laid out in the conceptual model, earnings
comprise two parts: hours worked and wages. Estimated wages, hours, and earnings
equations include a selectivity correction for participating in the labor force and the
predicted probability of choosing formal childcare, mother’s characteristics, household
socioeconomic status, price of formal and informal care, and household size and demographic composition. Household size and demographic variables are included in the
three regressions, as it is possible that these may influence the number of hours worked,
even after conditioning on the choice to work.
Given the difficulties of estimating an earnings equation even without the double
control for selection into the labor force and into type of childcare, we experiment with two
approaches to estimate maternal earnings. We first use a “quasi-reduced-form” equation;
here the reduced-form determinants of wage and hours are included along with a selection
term for entry into the labor force and the predicted probability of using formal daycare. We
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then employ an intermediate strategy by estimating the two components of earnings separately. Hours and wage equations are estimated separately, controlling for the two selection
factors each time. This is intended to lend insights into the pathways through which childcare
prices influence maternal earnings; if the influence is through wages, mothers may have
greater earning potential without having to sacrifice more time (leisure and other types).
R ESULTS
Demographic, labor force, and socioeconomic
characteristics of mothers
Characteristics of mothers in the sample (all mothers, working mothers, and nonworking mothers) are presented in Table 1. Thirty-seven percent of mothers worked for
pay in the month before the survey. A number of significant differences are observed
between working and nonworking mothers. On average, working mothers are nearly
three years older and are more likely to be indigenous (defined as speaking a Mayan
language or customarily wearing indigenous clothing). Their civil status also differs:
Working mothers are more likely to be single, separated, divorced, or widowed instead
of currently married or in a consensual union. Working mothers are also more likely to
reside in single nuclear households that are smaller and are less likely to have a male
household head. Each of these factors is likely to be associated with less socioeconomic
security and a greater need for wage employment among current household members.
Working mothers have fewer resident preschoolers, and the preschoolers they have
are older. This is consistent with evidence cited above regarding child age and maternal reentry into the labor force after a child’s birth. Households with working mothers have a larger
number of other females who may act as substitute caregivers, similar to the findings of
Connelly, DeGraff, and Levison (1996) and Connelly, DeGraff, Levison, and McCall (1996).
Asset positions also vary between households that have mothers who work and
those that do not. Households with working mothers have lower per capita asset values.
They also have fewer assets that can be classified as productive (i.e., that can be used to
earn income), implying that wage labor is most likely to be an important livelihood
strategy for these households.
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Table 1 Characteristics of mothers with preschoolers: All mothers, working
mothers, and nonworking mothers

Mother’s characteristics
Age (yrs)
Years of schooling
Literate (yes/no)
Indigenous
Single
Married or cohabiting
Separated, divorced,
widowed

All
mothers
Mean
SD

Working
mothers
Mean
SD

Nonworking
mothers
Mean
SD

Difference test:
Working =
nonworking

28.77
5.85
0.89
0.10
0.06
0.83

7.90
3.71
0.31
0.30
0.23
0.37

30.50
5.97
0.88
0.13
0.09
0.70

7.64
3.90
0.32
0.34
0.29
0.46

27.75
5.78
0.90
0.08
0.03
0.91

7.88
3.59
0.30
0.28
0.18
0.29

0.00
0.37
0.22
0.01
0.00
0.00

0.11

0.31

0.21

0.40

0.06

0.23

0.00

Household headship
Male head present

0.83

0.38

0.70

0.46

0.91

0.29

0.00

Household structure
Nuclear
Compound, relatives
Compound, nonrelatives
Compound, mixed

0.32
0.37
0.24
0.37

0.47
0.48
0.43
0.48

0.37
0.34
0.23
0.34

0.48
0.48
0.42
0.48

0.29
0.39
0.25
0.39

0.46
0.49
0.43
0.49

0.01
0.11
0.35
0.11

5.34
1.51

2.26
0.69

5.06
1.66

2.04
0.77

0.02
0.00

2.43
2.13
1.65
2.22
0.80

1.84
1.43
1.17
1.67
0.40

1.81
1.72
1.61
2.26
0.82

1.74
1.15
0.99
3.47
0.38

0.00
0.00
0.50
0.81
0.27

0.28

0.45

0.21

0.41

0.03

0.27

0.44

0.30

0.46

0.14

0.48

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

8.82

14.08

9.37

12.45

8.36

0.00

0.46

0.35

0.48

0.29

0.45

0.01

0.10

0.03

0.17

0.00

0.00

0.00

Household structure and alternate caretakers
Household size
5.16
2.13
No. preschoolers
1.60
0.74
Age youngest child
(yrs)
2.04
1.80
No. females >7 yrs
1.88
1.28
No. males >7 yrs
1.62
1.06
No. sisters >15 yrs
2.24
2.93
Woman’s mother alive 0.82
0.39
Woman’s mother
resides with her
0.23
0.42
Woman’s mother
resides in capital city 0.29
0.45
Employment status/childcare
Worked for pay in
last month
0.37
Years potential
experience
13.12
Received formal
training
0.31
Child in Hogar
Comunitario
0.01

continued
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Table 1

continued

All
mothers
Mean
SD
Asset position
Value/capita
9,098.3 14,813.5
Value household
(hh) total
41,757.6 60,576.9
Value hh
productive type 4,458.2 9,989.9
Value hh
nonproductive
type
37,299.4 56,083.1
No. observations
n=1,363

Working
mothers
Mean
SD

Nonworking
mothers
Mean
SD

8,157.9 10,577.2

9,651.8 16,796.6

0.07

39,164.1 48,713.7 43,284.1 66,558.5

0.23

3,788.8

8,062.1

Difference test:
Working =
nonworking

4,852.2 10,952.7

0.06

35,375.2 45,950.9 38,431.9 61,265.9
n=505
n=858

0.33

Employment, jobs, and remuneration of working mothers
Primary employment situations of working mothers are presented in Table 2.
Half have salaried positions, around 40 percent are self-employed, and the remainder
work for a daily wage or on a piece-rate basis. Total employment hours worked in the
month preceding the survey average 153. In the table, hours are converted to standardized eight-hour days for ease of comparison of wages between employment types. Standardized days worked per month average around 19; however, mothers in daily wage/
piece-rate jobs work fewer hours.
Earnings per standardized eight-hour work day (our wage measure) are low for
the daily wage/piece-rate group and for the self-employed. Earnings for a standardized
day are highest for mothers in salaried government jobs; however, only 3 percent of
working mothers in the sample are in this type of employment. Mothers in salaried
private-enterprise jobs—about one-half of the sample mothers who work—have daily
and monthly earnings well above the sample mean.
Job type data, shown in Table 3, reveal that a large percentage of mothers work in
service-sector positions: one-quarter work as domestics, one-quarter as itinerant vendors, 6 percent as police or soldiers, and another 13 percent as either childcare, clerical,
or education workers. Twenty-nine percent of mothers work in a factory, a small business, or as artisans. The number of standardized days worked in the previous month
does not vary greatly among the more prevalent job types: the mean is 19 eight-hour

16

Table 2

Type of employment and earnings: Working mothers only (n=502)

Salaried work,
private enterprise
Salaried work,
government
Daily wage/piece-rate
Self-employed
Unpaid work
Mean

Table 3

Standardized
(8-hour)
Earnings
days worked
past month
past month (1999 quetzals)

Earnings per
8-hour day
(1999 quetzals)

Percent

Hours
past month

50.60

150.00

18.75

765.83

41.27

3.19
7.97
37.85
0.20

164.16
122.16
163.68
160.00
153.12

20.52
15.27
20.46
20.00
19.14

1,101.94
442.62
479.86
0.00
640.03

57.37
31.72
30.37
0.00
37.45

Type of job: Working mothers only (n=502)

Childcare worker
Nonagricultural laborer
Domestic worker
Itinerant vendor
Artisan
Factory/small business worker
Police/soldier, etc.
Clerical worker
Teacher
Mean

Percent
2.59
0.20
23.51
26.49
6.97
22.11
6.37
8.37
1.99

Standardized
(8-hour)
days worked
past month
23.15
12.00
18.55
18.70
19.11
20.09
18.48
20.02
18.50
19.14

Earnings
Earnings per
past month
8-hour day
(1999 quetzals) (1999 quetzals)
430.77
19.27
480.00
40.00
484.43
32.69
519.78
37.59
549.57
29.01
738.22
37.59
686.66
51.27
1,367.98
59.81
541.30
29.58
640.03
37.45

days per month. Highest-paying jobs per standardized day (and per month since hours
do not vary greatly across job type) are clerical worker and police/soldier, and the lowest-paying is childcare (although this job is likely to be associated with having a more
flexible schedule).
Daycare arrangements for working mothers
Table 4 displays the childcare arrangements of working mothers; there are seven
major types. These include public formal daycare (the Hogares Comunitarios facilities) (3% of the total), private formal daycare (22%), care of the child by the mother
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Table 4

Childcare arrangements for working mothers
Formal childcare
Public
formal
daycare
(Hogares Private
Comuformal Mother
nitarios)
daycare herself

Percentage of working
mothers who use
this type of carea
Number of care types
used by mothers who
use this type of care
Price/hour of careb
Hours of care/child/dayc
Typical monthly/child
expense for this
type of cared

3

22

42

Informal childcare

Other
resident
household
member

29

Nonresident
relative

21

Child
Neighbor/ left
other
alone

7

2

1.36
0.23
10.95

1.97
0.85
4.59

1.31
0.00
8.77

1.44
0.36
9.11

1.50
0.70
8.55

1.54
1.02
9.58

1.82
0.00
9.96

54.58

84.55

0.00

71.07

129.69

211.75

0.00

a Sum of percentages exceeds 100 because one-quarter of working mothers use more than one type of care.
b Equals cash payments plus the value of in-kind payments.
c A small proportion of women with rotating or irregular schedules do not report care hours per day and are

excluded from this statistic. If the mother watches the child while working or the child is left alone, childcare
hours are set equal to mother’s work hours. If the same type of care is used twice in a single day, care hours are
summed for that day.
d Based on a five-day care week at mean price and hours. Typical monthly per-child expense = (mean care hours/
day) × (mean price/hour) × (21.67 weekdays/month).

herself while working (42%), care by a resident household member who is not the
mother (29%), care by a nonhousehold resident relative (21%), care by a neighbor or
other nonrelative (7%), and leaving the child alone (2%). In the models estimated
here, formal care comprises the first two categories, and informal care the other five.
Childcare supply is assumed exogenous. A full one-quarter of working mothers use
more than one type of daycare arrangement during the Monday–Friday work period.
Price per hour of childcare (cash plus the value of in-kind payments) is lowest when
the child is cared for by the mother while working, and when the child is left alone.
Aside from these two categories, the Hogares Comunitarios public daycare is the
lowest-priced alternative. The most expensive type of care is that provided by a neighbor or other unrelated individual. Hours of care per child per day are greatest for
children in public formal daycare.12
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Determinants of labor force participation and
use of formal childcare
Table 5 presents the regression results from (1) a bivariate probit model of a
mother’s joint decision to use formal childcare and to work and (2) an endogenous treatment effects model of a mother’s joint decision to use formal childcare and the number
of hours she works. In each model, the determinants of whether or not to use formal care
were virtually identical; therefore, only the bivariate probit results are displayed in the
table. The dependent variables in the bivariate probit model are a binary variable for the
use of formal daycare (versus informal daycare or care by the mother herself) and a
binary variable for working for pay in the past 30 days (versus not working for pay). In
the treatment effects model, the dependent variables are a binary variable for the use of
formal daycare and a continuous variable for hours worked (including zero hours).
In the bivariate probit model, we reject the null hypothesis that the decisions to
use formal childcare and to enter the labor force are independent (the Wald test shows
that ∆ is significantly different from zero).
A woman’s education and age positively and significantly affect her choice of
formal daycare. Use of formal care also increases with the number of children she has
between 3 and 7 years of age; this is the age group that is usually accepted by formal
daycare providers and is in fact the target age group of the Hogares Comunitarios program. While none of the price variables is significant at the 5 percent level, time costs
(which are part of the implicit price of daycare) influence a woman’s choice of formal
care. The median time from her home to the provider for formal care has a negative
effect on her choice of formal care.
We find that life-cycle and demographic factors are important variables in a
woman’s decision to work, more so than her education. Age, age squared, and ethnicity
figure significantly in the labor force participation equation. Among household characteristics (excluding the category females ages 30–45), we find that the presence of female infants under age 3 decreases the probability that a woman will work. A woman is
more likely to work if there are substitute female caregivers; among females ages 7–14,
15–18, 19–29, and 45–64, the largest and most significant effect is from women be-
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Table 5 Joint determinants of use of formal daycare and (1) labor force participation
and (2) hours worked
Worked for pay
Uses formal daycare in past 30 days
Coefficient
z
Coefficient
z
Woman’s personal characteristics
Educational attainment
Age (yrs)
Age squared
Years lived in capital city
Indigenous
Household (hh) characteristics
Log hh size
No. males age 0–2 yrs
No. females age 0–2 yrs
No. males age 3–6 yrs
No. females age 3–6 yrs
No. males age 7–14 yrs
No. females age 7–14 yrs
No. males age 15–18 yrs
No. females age 15–18 yrs
No. males age 19–29 yrs
No. females age 19–29 yrs
No. males age 30–44 yrs
No. males age 45–64 yrs
No. females age 45–64 yrs
No. males age 65 yrs and older
No. females age 65 yrs and older
Value of productive assets/
1,000 (quetzales)
Community characteristics
Median price/hour formal care
Median price/hour informal care
Median travel time from care to
work for formal care
Median travel time from care to
work for informal care
Median travel time from home to
care for formal care
No. formal preschools
Median female earnings/hour
Proportion working mothers

Hours worked in
past 30 days
Coefficient
z

0.06
0.09
0.00
0.01
–0.02

4.31
2.61
–2.15
1.34
–0.10

0.02
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.41

1.54
5.06
–4.54
–0.97
3.19

–0.35
8.65
–0.11
–0.51
25.83

–0.33
3.65
–3.40
–1.38
2.46

–0.30
0.03
–0.07
0.71
0.73
0.05
–0.07
–0.01
–0.16
–0.05
–0.08
0.06
–0.16
–0.02
0.02
0.08

–0.62
0.23
–0.49
5.62
5.93
0.42
–0.64
–0.04
–1.12
–0.36
–0.79
0.39
–0.88
–0.12
0.08
0.29

–0.36
–0.11
–0.30
–0.04
0.04
0.07
0.17
0.17
0.26
–0.29
0.16
–0.22
–0.29
0.59
0.05
0.20

–0.83
–0.88
–2.23
–0.39
0.34
0.70
1.73
1.28
2.10
–2.33
1.79
–1.52
–1.66
3.66
0.20
0.77

–17.84
–10.47
–14.76
–7.54
–1.97
2.96
6.70
3.52
14.02
–22.80
3.21
–30.42
–22.44
36.27
–7.68
24.71

–0.59
–1.28
–1.76
–0.86
–0.22
0.40
0.95
0.36
1.51
–2.75
0.49
–3.08
–1.78
3.06
–0.38
1.22

0.00

–0.54

–0.02

–2.81

–0.52

–1.60

1.11
0.92

1.70
1.76

—
0.31

—
0.55

0.01

0.50

0.00

0.20

–0.19

–0.17

0.00

0.37

0.00

–0.32

0.27

0.34

–0.04
–0.01
—
—

–2.47
–0.21
—
—

0.02
—
–0.07
4.07

1.13
—
–0.32
1.86

1.26
—
–4.34
409.32

0.34
—
–0.25
1.81

—
32.43

—
0.75

continued
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Table 5

continued

Worked for pay
Uses formal daycare in past 30 days
Coefficient
z
Coefficient
z
Family background variables
Nonrelative care used by
woman’s mother
Value of woman’s preunion assets/
1,000 (quetzales)
Woman was only female in her
hh as teenager
Only mother lived at home
when teenager
Woman was eldest child at home
when teenager
Mother of woman worked for pay
when woman was child
Predicted use of formal daycare
Constant
Number of observations
Log likelihood
Wald (chi-square)
p-value
Wald test of rho=0
p-value
LR test of rho=0
p-value

Hours worked in
past 30 days
Coefficient
z

0.15

0.58

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.05

2.41

–0.13

–0.06

—

—

–0.04

–0.39

–1.45

–0.19

—

—

0.17

0.95

13.58

0.95

—

—

0.06

0.66

2.56

0.35

—

—

0.11

1.43

–4.05

–4.94

–3.62

6.30
2.79
–189.43

0.99
0.11
–1.55

–3.72
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

1,271
–1,252.77
341.11
0.000
9.77
0.0018
—
—

1,274
–8,276.21
92.01
0.000
—
—
0.38
0.5397

Note: Regressions are with robust standard errors; z statistics in bold are significant at 5% or better.

tween 45 and 64 years of age. Conversely, the presence of adult males slightly decreases
a woman’s probability of working for pay.
Wealth and a woman’s bargaining power are important determinants of her labor
force participation. Women whose households have more productive assets are less likely
to work outside the home, but a woman who brings more assets to her marriage is more
likely to work. The bulk of asset values brought by women to their unions were land and
a house, which no doubt result in stronger bargaining power in the use of their own time.
This is the only family background variable that is significant in the labor force participation decision.
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Table 6 Determinants of wages, hours worked, and earnings (OLS with robust
standard errors)
Wage per hour
Coefficient
t

Hours worked
Coefficient
t

Earnings
Coefficient

t

Woman’s personal characteristics
Educational attainment
Age (yrs)
Age squared
Indigenous

0.45
0.27
0.00
–0.47

2.11
0.32
–0.24
–0.29

–3.10
–12.37
0.17
–2.09

–1.11
–1.13
1.10
–0.08

18.80
41.23
–0.58
38.81

1.63
0.95
–1.00
0.44

Household (hh) characteristics
Log hh size
No. males age 0–2 yrs
No. females age 0–2 yrs
No. males age 3–6 yrs
No. females age 3–6 yrs
No. males age 7–14 yrs
No. females age 7–14 yrs
No. males age 15–18 yrs
No. females age 15–18 yrs
No. males age 19–29 yrs
No. females age 19–29 yrs
No. males age 30–44 yrs
No. males age 45–64 yrs
No. females age 45–64 yrs
No. males age 65 yrs and older
No. females age 65 yrs and older
Value of productive assets (quetzales)

–3.24
0.11
1.68
3.53
4.76
0.64
0.09
2.13
1.19
–0.05
–1.08
0.76
–1.27
–0.56
0.70
0.63
4.44

–0.69
0.11
1.01
2.11
1.99
0.66
0.07
1.09
0.76
–0.03
–0.86
0.67
–0.65
–0.27
0.48
0.42
0.82

63.88
–6.31
0.14
–16.81
–25.99
–9.35
–19.31
–11.73
–18.75
–6.69
–12.84
–28.72
–25.25
–14.12
–19.58
–35.32
–2.35

1.03
–0.40
0.01
–0.71
–0.97
–0.59
–1.14
–0.52
–0.82
–0.35
–0.84
–1.51
–0.96
–0.42
–0.49
–1.21
–0.05

115.67
–30.40
–90.42
–29.08
–48.69
–37.78
–3.71
–32.12
2.42
–96.85
–57.07
–183.85
–126.82
91.14
–246.45
128.35
–225.48

0.50
–0.47
–1.05
–0.39
–0.57
–0.72
–0.06
–0.49
0.03
–1.23
–0.98
–2.21
–1.00
0.64
–1.67
0.72
–1.32

0.21
0.00
–11.51
3.26
–5.31

0.07
1.16
–1.27
0.76
–0.34

–3.04
0.00
–7.35
–44.38
453.57

–0.05
–0.43
–0.07
–0.68
2.08

–122.43
0.01
–56.42
94.77
–93.96

–0.76
1.56
–0.17
0.38
–0.10

Community characteristics
Median price/hour formal care
Median price/hour informal care
Predicted use of formal care
Selectivity correction
Constant
Number of observations
F value
Prob > F
R-squared

342
1.48
0.0683
0.0781

357
0.94
0.555
0.0503

434
1.12
0.32
0.1136

Note: t statistics in bold indicate significance at 5% or better.

In the treatment effects model, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the decisions to use formal childcare and the number of hours to work (unconditional on entering the labor force) are independent. This suggests that use of formal childcare is related
to a mother’s decision to work but not to the number of hours worked once she has
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decided to participate in the labor force. Most of the life-cycle and demographic factors
that affect labor force entry also influence unconditional hours worked.
Determinants of earnings
Table 6 presents wage, hours, and earnings equations, estimated only on the sample
of working women, but with the labor force selectivity correction and formal care probabilities estimated using coefficients from the bivariate probit regressions. Once selection into the labor force and formal care choice are accounted for, a woman’s education
and the presence of children ages 3–7 years in the household are the only significant
determinants of wages. None of the determinants of hours worked is found to be statistically significant once we control for selection into the labor force and the predicted use
of formal care. For earnings, the number of adult and elderly males in the household has
a strong negative effect, indicating that women may earn less in households where a
male is the primary income earner. While the price of formal care has a negative effect,
the coefficient is not significant. Thus it appears that use of formal care and the availability of formal care affect only the decision to work, and not wages, hours worked, or
earnings conditional on a woman’s participation in the labor force.
C ONCLUSION
Reducing barriers to obtaining employment is crucial for helping alleviate poverty among women in the urban slums of Guatemala. Across Latin America, higher
labor force participation rates of women are associated with higher household incomes
(Sedlacek, Gutierrez, and Mohindra 1993). Among the obstacles limiting the employment options of poor women is residence in households with high dependency ratios
that are often headed by women. Finding reliable and affordable childcare is a challenge
for mothers who reside in urban slums. Because many are migrants from rural areas,
they may be far away from extended family and have less access to informal alternative
caregivers. Over 40 percent of randomly sampled mothers working in the slum area of
Guatemala City cared for their children themselves while they were working in paid
jobs. Changes in the structure of urban production toward more manufacturing and industrial settings means employment opportunities for women will occur increasingly in
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settings that are not compatible with the care of children: market work and caring for
one’s children are activities that will become more separate and as such will compete for
a mother’s time. This trend is expected to increase the demand for nonparental childcare
in urban Guatemala. Lack of availability and high prices for childcare may decrease the
earning potential of poor mothers.
This study investigated whether interventions to increase the availability and lower
the price of childcare to poor working mothers increase their total earnings, conditional
on their decision to work. Recognizing that a mother’s work status may depend on the
availability of childcare, participation in the labor market and use of formal daycare are
modeled as joint decisions. Our results indicated that these are in fact joint decisions for
poor working mothers. Life-cycle and household demographic factors have important
effects on both decisions, while mother’s education is an important determinant of use of
formal daycare. Higher household wealth reduces a mother’s chances of working; however, her status within the household (as proxied by the value of assets she brought to her
marriage) increases the likelihood of her working. Higher time costs of using formal
daycare reduce use of formal care. Controlling for endogeneity of labor market participation and formal daycare use, the price of formal daycare has negative but insignificant
effects on mother’s earnings. This suggests that interventions to increase the availability
and lower the time costs of formal daycare in poor urban areas have the potential to raise
labor force participation rates of mothers residing in such neighborhoods, but not necessarily their earnings conditional upon their having entered the labor force.
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Appendix

Description of the Hogares Comunitarios government-

sponsored daycare program in Guatemala
The Community Daycare Centers Program of the Secretary of Social Works of
the First Lady of the Republic of Guatemala (Programa de Hogares Comunitarios de la
Secretaria de Obras Sociales de la Esposa del Presidente de la República) was created
to alleviate poverty and to promote integrated child development in poor communities.
The program was initiated in 1991 as a response to the deteriorating socioeconomic
situation of the country, reflected in high rates of childhood malnutrition (the prevalence
of stunting was as high as 50 percent nationally) and the scarcity of preschool education
and early stimulation programs for children 3–6 years old. The program was launched
as a pilot project that established 20 daycare centers in the capital city. The successful
pilot project was followed by expansion of the program to various municipalities within
six departments of the country. By 1996, the program covered all 22 departments of
Guatemala. By January 1998, the program had established 1,200 community daycare
centers throughout the country that provided care for approximately 10,000 children
ages 0–7 years.
The official program documentation describes the community daycare centers,
or Hogares Comunitarios, as a nontraditional alternative to ensure the care of children
of working parents in communities characterized by poverty and extreme poverty and
lack of access to alternative childcare. In these communities, a local woman is selected
by a group of parents to become the madre cuidadora, or the program caregiver mother.
In her home, she is responsible for caring for a set of ten children under the age of 7
years from 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M., Monday–Friday. During their hours in the hogar, the
children receive affection and care, proper hygiene, security, and food (i.e., breakfast, a
morning snack, lunch, and an afternoon snack). In addition, educational activities are
offered by the madre cuidadora to stimulate child development and to “foment the formation of values and good personal hygiene habits.”
In addition to providing initial training of the madres cuidadoras, the program
initially provides each hogar with furniture, cooking and feeding equipment, and supplies for ten children. On a monthly basis, the program offers the equivalent of approxi-
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mately $0.55 per child per day to the program caregivers to purchase food for the children, $0.03 per child per day for educational material, and $0.03 per child per day for
cooking fuel. Caregivers also receive an incentive of $3.33 per child per month for their
work. Parents of the children are expected to provide monthly supplies of sugar, Incaparina
(weaning cereal mix), toothpaste, toilet paper, and hand-washing soap, and to pay $5.00
per month to the program caregiver for each participating child. Each daycare center
receives monthly donations of food commodities from the World Food Program (usually 44 pounds of maize, one gallon of cooking oil, and 13 pounds of black beans or six
cans of fish).
The program is one of the few currently operating in urban Guatemala to target
women, particularly working mothers with children under 7 years of age. Most programs in the country with a gender component are located in rural former conflict zones
of the country’s long civil war. (IFPRI 1998 provides a short description of these programs.)
Although the Hogares Comunitarios program covers all departments of the country, in 1999 the urban slums of Guatemala City hosted almost 25 percent of all hogares.
The program was promoted in this area in recognition that many women there are single
mothers or household heads who are under increased pressure to work outside the home
in income-generating activities. Childcare alternatives are likely to be a major constraint
to the employment opportunities of these women.
Other daycare programs in Latin America
There are a number of child daycare programs in Latin America, many of which
are structured along a home-based community model similar to the Hogares Comunitarios
program in Guatemala. They include the Programa Integrado por Desarrollo Infantil in
Bolivia; the Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar in Colombia; the Wawa Wasi program
in Peru; and the Programa de Cuidado Diario in Venezuela. IFPRI (1998) describes
each program and its characteristics.
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Appendix table Modules and data collected for random sample (N=1,363 households)
Data collection module
Household roster

Type of information collected
Identification, names, age (date of birth), gender, relation to
household (hh) head, civil status, occupation (whether or not
hh member works, goes to school, etc.), schooling (years
achieved), resident status (past month)

Mother’s labor force participation
Mother’s employment
experience and training

Age started working for pay and training type received (if
any)

Mother’s current employment

How found job, how long in job; occupation, type/size of
employer, sector, hours worked/schedule; earnings, wages,
benefits; how many days worked in past month; how many
days of work missed in past month; reasons why work was
missed; other employment (up to 3 total)

Childcare arrangements
For everyone

Current childcare arrangements, including date started with
this arrangement, hours/schedule of use, compared to
official schedule; price paid; additional arrangements
during weekdays; time to travel to daycare and to work;
mother’s trust of caregiver, reason for using this arrangement; personal acquaintance with caregiver before starting

If not in the Hogares
Comunitarios program

Knowledge of program; desire to enter in such a program
(hypothetically); whether or not on a waiting list; any madre
cuidadora known personally; would child have necessary
papers to enter program

Household assets

Asset ownership and values (physical and financial)

Family history and social networks
Mother of respondent mother

Civil status, family situation, worked outside the home, used
daycare alternatives

Respondent mother

Birth order, age left her family, age married or in union the
first time

Migration

Where born, when migrated to city (if applicable), how long
resident in Guatemala City, how long resident in this
particular community

Social networks

Number of relatives in Guatemala City (gender, do women
relatives work outside the home), number of relatives in
neighborhood, how often are they visited, person who would
help if help needed

Child and mother anthropometric
measurements
Household hygiene characteristics

Weight and height
Observations of conditions; availability of water, electricity,
garbage collection, and other services
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Notes
1

The latter is particularly prevalent in Guatemala because of the deaths of males
that resulted from the country’s protracted civil conflict. The violence in rural
areas led to urban migration of women who had lost husbands or other family
members (Steel 1993).

2

What is more, these averages mask large differences by age and ethnicity. Younger
and nonindigenous women have greater access to schooling and thus higher education levels. Many older and indigenous women who migrated to urban areas as adults
were raised in rural areas, where schools are not widely available or accessible.

3

Funkhouser (1996) defines the informal sector as all self-employed workers and
workers in firms with four or fewer employees who are not professional, technical, or administrative.

4

The project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of
Women in Development, was a collaborative effort between the IFPRI, the Community Daycare Centers Program of the Secretary of Social Works of the First
Lady of the Republic of Guatemala, and the Institute of Nutrition of Central America
and Panama/Pan American Health Organization (INCAP/PAHO). The overall objective of this study was to identify constraints to the implementation and impact of
the Hogares Comunitarios program (designed to serve poor working mothers with
preschool children; see Appendix for a full description), provide recommendations
for improving the program, and design specific activities to strengthen particular
components of the program. The project included three phases: (1) qualitative and
operational research evaluation, which was carried out by IFPRI between February
and July 1998; (2) technical assistance provided by INCAP to the Hogares
Comunitarios program, initiated in February 1998; and (3) impact evaluation carried out by IFPRI.

5

Alternatively, one could include childcare as a component of the bundle of goods
and services that the household consumes, but it is easier to treat it as a “cost” of
participating in the labor force.
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6

Two studies have attempted to address this issue by estimating childcare and
labor supply decisions jointly. Ribar (1992) and Connelly, DeGraff, and Levison
(1996) each use a recursive approach. Determinants of labor force entry are estimated, then estimated coefficients from this equation are used to correct for sample
selection in the childcare demand equation. Connelly, DeGraff, Levison, and
McCall (1996) estimate a similar model, but take on the additional challenge of
treating recent births as endogenous.

7

This may indicate that there are factors common to mother’s work and childcare
preferences, as mentioned in our discussion of demand for childcare.

8

The small number of studies is most likely due to the fact that formal childcare is
only beginning to become available in developing countries. Furthermore, for
services that are available, data on use and characteristics are lacking.

9

Price is defined here as the community median expenditure per hour of care used
for each care type. A discussion of issues in specifying the price of childcare can
be found in Gelbach’s (2002) study. Various measures of price have been used:
expenditure per hour of care, expenditure per mother hour worked, wages for
childcare workers, average cost for care in the state or community, among others
(Averett, Peters, and Waldman 1997; Barrow 1996; Berger and Black 1992; Blau
and Robins 1988; Gelbach 2002; Meara 1996). The use of own expenditure as
price is problematic because it is endogenous and does not accurately reflect the
menu of available “prices” because of the selection bias resulting from only certain types of individuals actually purchasing each type of care. It could also be
influenced by differences in quality of care, which are often unmeasured and
therefore not controlled for. One approach has been to attempt to estimate a predicted childcare price to use in the childcare demand equation. This approach is
fraught with difficulties, however, mainly because of the need to exclude variables from the labor supply equation to use as instruments for childcare expenditure, even when these variables (1) are unlikely to be good instruments for childcare
expenditure, and (2) can often be expected to directly affect labor supply itself.
The use of community-level median prices avoids most of these problems.
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10

In estimating an earnings equation for Guatemalan women, Arends (1992) controls for selection into the labor force (but not choice of childcare), treats hours as
exogenous, and uses reduced-form determinants of the wage.

11

Examining the joint outcomes of using formal daycare and mother’s work hours
was suggested by an earlier reviewer.

12

Given the low hourly price, the high number of service hours (12) available per
day, and the high degree of parental satisfaction with the Hogares Comunitarios
program found in the operations evaluation component (Ruel, de la Brière, Hallman
et al. 2002), it might seem surprising that more parents do not make use of the
program. The low rates of use, however, stem from supply constraints. At the time
of the survey in 1999, the program was still in a pilot phase and was focusing on
improving the quality of care in the hogares before expanding the number available. It appears that filling slots in future Hogares Comunitarios will not be difficult. This perception is reinforced by a finding in the operations evaluation that
when a child drops out of an hogar, the caregiver mother is normally able to fill the
slot with another child within 24 hours (Ruel, de la Brière, Hallman et al. 2002).
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